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Executive Summary:
The expansion of regional economic cooperation was one of the major
developments in the world political economy after the Second World 
War. Factors that thrust countries closer were both economic and 
political but economic factors prevailed; the classic example was the 
EU and ASEAN where economic dimension have brought long time foes 
in the same dais. The present international economic situation
characterized by stagnant growth, recessionary conditions, and 
protectionist tendencies in the developed countries has seriously 
underpinned the economic growth in developing countries.1 The 
worsening terms of trade, acute balance of payment crisis and debt 
burden on developing countries have further crippled the potential 
economic growth of these countries. Therefore current world economic 
conditions call for a greater economic cooperation among the 
developing countries. Around 330 agreements are notified in World 
Trade Organization (WTO). Apart from Mongolia, all WTO members are 
involved in one or more regional trade agreements.2 Unsuccessful 
WTO talks in Cancun increased a world-wide trend towards regional 
cooperation and integration, such as EU, NAFTA, CAFTA, MERCOSUR, 
ASEAN, SAARC etc. 
                                                
1 Kanhiya Lal Chawla, Economic Cooperation among developing countries with special reference to 
SAARC: Jaipur, RSBA Publishers, 1991. p.1.
2 WTO website, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/bey1_e.htm
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The latest report by the World Bank, entitled Global Economic 
Prospects: Managing the Next Wave of Globalization predicts that in 
the next 25 years the growth in the global economy will be powered by 
the developing countries, whose share in global output will increase 
from about one-fifth of the global economy to nearly one-third. It 
means that some of the key drivers in the global economy will be 
China and some of the countries from South Asia. There are today six 
developing countries which have populations greater than 100 million 
and GDP of more than $100 billion. By 2030, there will be 10 countries 
that would have reached the twin 100s threshold, and four of them will 
be from the vicinity of South Asia. In addition to India and China, who
have already reached that level, Pakistan and Bangladesh are also 
likely to be part of this dynamic group.3
Increased participation in global trade was an important determinant 
of economic growth of the catch-up economies. This is one reason why 
South Asia has lagged and has not been a catch-up economy. Could 
the decision of the 2004 SAARC summit change South Asia’s economic 
structure and move towards economic union? Can South Asia become 
a major player in the global economic and trading system? The 
                                                
3 The third decade of Saarc: by Sridhar K. Khatri. Volume 2, Issue 4, May 2007, Monthly Forum, Daily 
Stare. http://thedailystar.net/forum/2007/may/saarc.htm
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following report aims to come across the answer of the above issue 
regarding SAFTA.
Introduction:
The crumple of the WTO negotiations in late July 2006 augments the
significance in regional trading arrangements in South Asia. The first 
step in this direction came in 1995 when SAPTA signed. SAFTA was a 
parallel initiative to the multilateral trade liberalization commitments of 
SAARC4 member countries which signed in 2004 with the aim of 
reducing tariffs for interregional trade among the SAARC members.5
There have been strong arguments for the creation of regional 
economic integration in South Asia which generate significant 
interregional trade and welfare gains for the South Asian countries. 
However, critics have pointed out that the potential benefits from the
SAFTA and other regional trading arrangements in South Asia are little 
because there are limited complementarities in the region; major 
trading partners of the individual South Asian countries are located in 
                                                
4 The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) was established when its Charter was 
formally adopted on December 8, 1985 by the Heads of State or Government of Bangladesh, Bhutan, 
India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. SAARC provides a platform for the peoples of South Asia to 
work together in a spirit of friendship, trust and understanding. It aims to accelerate the process of 
economic and social development in Member States. http://www.saarc-sec.org/main.php
5 Welfare Effects of South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) Regional Trading Arrangements (RTAs) in South 
Asia: Implications for the Bangladesh Economy. Selim Raihan and M. A. Razzaque January 2007 Paper 
prepared for the UNDP Regional Centre Colombo.
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the West, and RTAs in South Asia will lead to substantial trade 
diversion than trade creation and it may work as a stumbling block to 
multilateral trade liberalization.6
Recently South Asia has been the second fastest growing region in the 
world. Having more than 22 per cent of the world's population living 
on only 3.8 per cent of the total land area of the world, it is home for 
more than half a billion poor people, or 40 per cent of world's poor.7
Its shares of world GNP and purchasing power are very small (around 
2 per cent and 7 per cent, respectively). Its share in total world trade 
is even smaller, only about one percent.8 But from 1981 and 2001
there had been a marked improvement; the proportion of the extreme 
poor has gone down from 52 percent to 31 percent. Although this is 
not as significant as it is in East Asia, where the proportion plummeted 
from 58 percent to 15 percent, it was nevertheless a significant 
achievement for the region.9
In 1997 SAARC leaders had agreed to launch the SAFTA by 2001. The 
five-year delay was caused by deteriorating relations between India 
                                                
6 Ibid
7 IMF, The World Economic Outlook - 2005, International Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C., April 2005, 
Table 1.7, P. 33.
8 Bandara and McGillivray, 1998 and Panagariya, 1999 for an overview of trade reforms in the region.
9 Supra 3
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and Pakistan after nuclear tests by the two countries in May 1998, the 
military takeover in Pakistan in October 1999, and the near-war in 
2001 and 2002 when more than a million soldiers massed along the 
India–Pakistan border. Tensions began ease by April 2004 when Atal 
Bihari Vajpayee, then prime minister of India, pledged to work toward 
creating a peaceful South Asian region. The move to create SAFTA, 
therefore, represents a major development in the region. Properly 
implemented, SAFTA could bring both economic development and 
peace to the region. 
1. Motivations for the formation of RTAs:
1.1 Toning down political rivalry:
Most of the RTAs catch European integration as the template for
regional integration, little realizing the uniqueness with which Europe
was (and is still) blessed. Europe’s overriding objective, which was
brilliantly achieved, was political and military: to use economic
integration to overcome the historic animosities of its chief 
protagonists and thus render future wars impossible.10 Indeed, the 
preamble to the 1951 treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel 
Community, out of which EU grew, states its aim as follows: “To 
                                                
10 Bergsten, Fred (2000a), the New Asian Challenge, Working Paper 00-4, March, Institute for 
International Economics, Washington, D.C.
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create, by establishing an economic community, the basis for broader 
and deeper community among peoples long divided by bloody 
conflicts.”11
Economic compulsion in the region may eventually help to bring down 
the political barriers, particularly between India and Pakistan, in South 
Asia. The best examples are India and China, where the two countries 
after fighting a war in 1962, have, without resolving their territorial 
differences, engaged each other since the late 1980s. As a result, 
bilateral trade has boomed from less than $200 million in the early 
1990s to nearly $20 billion in 2005.12 China is set to overtake the EU 
and the US as India's largest trading partner within a few years. And, 
despite some political and territorial differences, both countries agreed 
to set up a "strategic partnership" in April 2005, which has led to 
frequent high-level visits by leaders to each others' capitals. If two 
rivals such as India and China can put their territorial differences aside 
to achieve major economic gains, it is also possible for India and 
Pakistan to find ways and means beneficial economically, without 
sacrificing their stands on political and territorial issues. The important 
thing is for Pakistan to overcome its fear that open trading 
arrangements with India, bilaterally or multilaterally, will not lead to 
                                                
11World Bank (2000), Trade Blocs, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
12 Supra 3
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Indian products swamping its market at the cost of its own industries. 
For its part, India needs to be confident of its growing economic power 
to be able to devise ways to placate the Pakistani fears, both real and 
imagined.
1.2 Bargaining power:
“United we stand”, as the saying goes, and by joining hands together
weak countries can become stronger. Caribbean Community and 
Common Market (CARICOM), the alliance of smaller Caribbean island 
states, is an exception among the developing countries groupings in as 
much as it negotiates in most of the international fora, including the 
WTO, in a unified manner. CARICOM is not only focused on achieving 
regional integration – rather its objective is common action. For 
example, they have taken the lead in formulating and articulating the 
position of the African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) countries group in 
negotiating the Lome Convention.13 South Asia can shadow CARICOM 
and act as united manner to the world fora.
1.3 Economic motives:
The economic effects of regional agreements are of two main types.
The first are removal of trade barriers and move toward integration in 
                                                
13 Supra 11
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a regional market. This allows firms to benefit from greater scale and 
attract Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). The second source of 
economic change is “trade and location” effects.
India is now the world's fourth largest economic power, and many 
expect it to surpass Japan to become the third largest very soon. The 
entrepreneurs, especially in the IT sector, are the catalyst in India's 
economic miracle, and have managed to fuel growth through the 
service sector and domestic consumption. India has managed to 
maintain an average of 7.5 percent growth rate for the past five years, 
despite archaic labour laws and "bureaucratic high modernism." India 
is not alone in registering a positive growth trend in the region, 
Bangladesh, Pakistan and Sri Lanka GDP has also shown a positive 
growth of around 7 percent. Roberto Zagha did a study in 2005 which 
lists as "growth successes" those countries with a faster per capita 
GDP growth rate than the US in the 1990’s, and a 1980’s growth rate 
of at least 1 percent. His list contains one Latin American country 
(Chile), a couple of small African countries (Botswana, Lesotho), no 
Eastern European or Central Asian country, but six of the eight South 
Asian countries.14
                                                
14 Supra 3
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The contribution of India (and one can add also China) as an engine of 
growth for South Asia will be substantial, since it accounts for (in 
2005) about 80 percent of South Asia's GDP, trade, and regional 
growth. In South Asia, India's development into a regional hub would 
attract more foreign direct investments into India and from India to 
other South Asian countries, which would boost economic growth in 
the whole region. As the latest ADB report states: "India is not only 
crucial for the success of regional trade cooperation in South Asia; it 
could also transform the development and growth pattern of the entire 
region."15
2. REGIONALISM: BUILDING BLOCK OR STUMBLING BLOCK?
At the turn of the 20th Century both globalism and regionalism are
coexisting in the global trading system. During the 1990’s, it was 
widely assumed that building complementary between regional and 
multilateral institutions was the only way to grapple with the 
complexities of the fast changing global economic and trade realities.
As per Larry Summers, any “ism” (bilateralism, regionalism and 
multilateralism) is good as long as its ultimate objective is trade 
liberalization. 16 Bergsten argue, “Regional arrangements promote 
                                                
15 ibid
16 Winters, L. Alan (1996), “Regionalism versus Multilateralism”, paper prepared for a CEPR Conference 
on Regional Integration, La Coruna, Spain, April 26-27, 1996.
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freer trade and multilateralism in at least two senses: that trade 
creation has generally exceeded trade diversion, and that the RTAs 
contribute to both internal and international dynamics that enhance 
rather than reduce the prospects for global liberalization.” Winter
states17, “Regionalism, by allowing stronger internalization of the gains 
from trade de-restriction, seems likely to be able to facilitate freer 
trade in highly restrictive circumstances or sector.”
3.1 WTO PROVISIONS FOR PTAS/RTAS:
PTAs are the agreements between two or more countries in which 
tariffs imposed on goods produced in the member countries are lower 
than on goods produced outside. This term differs from the most 
favored nation (MFN) trade liberalization clause which means each 
country lowers its trade barriers for all the trading partners regardless 
of the trade policies of other countries. Customs unions (CUs) are also 
PTAs in which all members adopt a common external tariff structure.18
Since RTAs represent a fundamental departure from the core WTO 
principles, it has provided its members a large degree of flexibility in 
entering RTAs. They may join agreements by meeting the 
requirements of the GATT Article XXIV covering the information of 
                                                
17 Winters Alan L. (1996), Regionalism vs. Multilateralism, World Bank, November 1996, Washington, 
D.C.
18 The Process of Economic Integration in South Asia International Finance Division, Research 
Department. April 27, 2005
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customs unions and free trade areas in merchandise trade; the 
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) Article V on 
agreements in services; or the Enabling Clause of dealing with trade in 
goods between developing countries.19
4. Economic Development: Trends and Comparative Statistics:
In 2002, the South Asian region’s estimated population was 1.4 billion 
and its combined gross domestic product was $640 billion, measured 
at market exchange rates, or $3.4 trillion in terms of purchasing power 
parity (PPP)20. This is a relatively poor region with average per capita 
income of only $467 in conventional terms and of $3,560 in PPP 
terms.21 By way of comparison, China in 2002 had a population of 
1.280 billion, while it’s GDP in both conventional and PPP terms were
considerably $1.234 trillion and $5.792 trillion, respectively. Its GDP 
per capita, estimated at $960 at market exchange rates, was more 
than twice as high as that of South Asia.22
                                                
19 ibid.
20 It is the method of using the long-run equilibrium exchange rate of two currencies to equalize the 
currencies' purchasing power. It is based on the law of one price, the idea that, in an efficient market, 
identical goods must have only one price. It is the method of using the long-run equilibrium exchange rate
of two currencies to equalize the currencies' purchasing power. It is based on the law of one price, the 
idea that, in an efficient market, identical goods must have only one price. 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Purchasing_power_parity
21 SOURCE: World Development Indicators 2004, the World Bank Group.
22 Potential of the South Asian Free Trade Area, Shahid Javed Burki the Senior Economic Advisor to 
USAID’s Bureau of Asia and the Near East (USAID/ANE)  U.S. Agency for International Development 
(USAID). http://www.lafollette.wisc.edu/publications/workshops/2003-2004/pa869/2004-SAFTA.pdf.
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South Asian intraregional trade volume is currently around $4–6 billion 
per year23. India’s dominance in regional trade is very much apparent; 
there is no clear secondary competitor. Between 1992 and 2002 
India’s exports go up to the region from $710 million to $2.8 billion. 
By contrast, its imports were quite low: $166 million in 1992 and $531 
million in 2002.24 While less than 1 percent of India’s total imports 
came from South Asia, and 4 to 5 percent of its exports went to the 
region. Throughout the 1990’s, Bangladesh was the second largest 
contributor to trade within South Asia. Data and estimates for 2002, 
however, indicate that Sri Lanka likely surpassed Bangladesh. 
Pakistan’s economy is the region’s second largest, but its annual 
contributions to intraregional trade declined between 1998 and 2002.25
The global production system now encompasses a number of East 
Asian countries other than those in the developed world. South Asia, in 
contrast, did less well. Although the region’s GDP growth in 1980–
2000 and the share of exports in output increased. Non-oil export 
shares of the East Asia and Pacific region increased from 18 percent in 
                                                
23 Malik, Nadeem. 2004. “New Dawn for South Asian Trade,” Asia Times Online, January 13.
Available at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/FA13Df04.html, accessed May 13, 2004.
24 Impacts of the South Asia Free Trade Agreement, Elizabeth Krueger Rossana Cecilia Bastos Pintom 
Policy Analysis Workshop, Public Affairs 869 Spring 2004. La Follette School of Public Affairs University of 
Wisconsin–Madison.
25 ibid
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1980, to 34 percent in 2000. The corresponding shares for the South 
Asia region were 8 and 14 percent, respectively.26
Robin Cook27, former Foreign Minister of Britain, said of the signing of 
the European Constitution, “Pause for a while to contemplate the 
remarkable transformation of European politics which made this event 
possible. Most of the countries sitting together in the same council 
chamber have been at war with each other in living memory and in the 
century that preceded it.” But progress toward increasing economic 
and political association among the countries of Europe was not always 
easy: “[T]heir appeal to past millennium betrays what drives their 
resistance to European integration—a misplaced nostalgia for the 
outdated world of free standing nations. It is an era that has vanished. 
We are all interdependent now” overview of economic development in 
the South Asian region underscores Robin Cook’s point: a great deal of 
historical baggage has to be cast off before countries in the region can 
begin to work together.
5. Historical Context for Regional Integration:
                                                
26 Supra 22
27 Cook, Robin. 2004. A Strong Europe—or Bush’s Feral US Capitalism. The Guardian, October 29.
U0621399
17
Under colonial rule this region was known as the Indian sub continent. 
According to historian Niall Ferguson, “1783 famine killed more than a 
fifth of the population of the India; this was followed by severe 
scarcities in 1791, 1801, and 1805”28. Blue-ribbon Royal Famine 
Commissions were established to devise a long-term solution to 
persistent food scarcities. British planners saw that the vast tracts of 
virgin land in Punjab and Sindh could be cultivated by irrigating them 
with water from the Indus river system. The strategy worked and 
within a few decades, Punjab and Sindh were producing surplus food 
grains. But this surplus had to be transported to the northeast, 
especially the heavily populated province of Bengal. To do this, the 
British invested heavily in transport infrastructure, a system of roads 
linked with the fabled Grand Trunk Road that linked Kabul with 
Calcutta, railways, and the port of Karachi. These investments formed 
the basis for close economic integration of the British Indian Empire 
and are now parts of the independent states of Bangladesh, India, and 
Pakistan. 
Moreover water dispute surfaced in the early 1950’s and almost 
brought India and Pakistan to war.29 Intense international diplomacy 
                                                
28 Ferguson, Niall. 2003. Empire: How Britain Made the Modern World, London: Allen Lane.
29 International Rivers linking project by India, elucidation from international water law: anticipated 
potential environment threats on Bangladesh. By A. S. M Shahriar kabir, South Asian journal, 2007 March.
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and the involvement of a consortium led by the World Bank salvaged 
the situation.30 Furthermore after partition in 1947 from British rule,
Pakistan refused to follow other countries of the “Sterling Area”31 in 
devaluing its currency with respect to the U.S. dollar; India, in return, 
refused to recognize the new exchange rate of 144 of its rupees to 100 
Pakistani rupees and halted all trade with its neighbor. Pakistan, 
starved of most manufactured goods of daily consumption launched a 
program of industrialization to achieve a measure of self-sufficiency.
Had this trade war not occurred, Pakistan would not have 
industrialized as rapidly as it did and would not have forsaken its 
comparative advantage in agriculture.32
All countries in the region pursued import-substitution approaches to 
economic development for nearly 40 years and trade among the 
countries fell from about 19 percent of total trade in 1948, to about 4 
percent by the end of the 1950s, and to 2 percent by 196733. The 
share of intraregional trade in total trade began to increase only after 
the countries abandoned import substitution in favor of general trade 
                                                
30 For a detailed account of the development of the dispute and its ultimate resolution see Aloys Mitchell, 
The Indus River, Yale University Press (1969).
31 The Sterling Area was made up of the countries of British colonies that had linked their currencies to 
the “sterling” or the British pound. The Sterling Area is roughly equivalent today’s Commonwealth.
32 Shahid Javed Burki, Pakistan: A Nation in the Making, West view Press (1980).
33 World Bank. 2004d. Trade Policies in South Asia: An Overview, 2004. Report  #29949. Washington, 
D.C.
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liberalization. Still, this increase is insignificant compared to trade 
among countries in other regions.34
The economic policies adopted by all countries in the region are 
another legacy. Jawaharlal Nehru, India’s first prime minister brought 
socialist economic management to his country and launched the 
“license raj”35. Over three decades this system left Indian economy
untouched.36 The Licence Raj is considered to have been dismantled in 
1990, when a macroeconomic crisis forced India to usher in economic 
reforms. The government of India finally initiated liberalization under 
the Prime Ministership of PV Narasimha Rao, which resulted in 
substantial growth in the Indian economy, which continues today. The 
efforts of the current Prime Minister and ex Finance Minister 
Manmohan Singh of PV Narasimha Rao ware eventually recognized.
                                                
34 Ibid. Intraregional trade accounted for 67 percent of the total for the European Union; 62 percent of 
NAFTA; and 26 percent for members of ASEAN.
35 India had a highly developed bureaucratic system before partition and they ran an elaborate system of 
rationing and price controls to prevent price gouging. The architect of the system of Licence Raj was 
Jawaharlal Nehru, India's first Prime Minister. Inspired by the economy in the Soviet Union, he was 
determined to implement the model in India. The Licence Raj was a result of India's decision to have a 
planned economy, where all aspects of the economy are controlled by the state and licences were given to 
a select few. The Licence Raj was a result of India's decision to have a planned economy, where all 
aspects of the economy are controlled by the state and licences were given to a select few. 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Licence_Raj
36 An excellent description of the license raj and the damage it did to the Indian economy is in Gurcharan 
Das, India Unbound. New Delhi: Penguin (2003).
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For a decade and half, Pakistan followed a different route, encouraging 
the private sector to help meet the enormous shortages of consumer 
goods created by the 1948 trade war with India. While encouraging 
private entrepreneurship, the state was generous in building a high 
wall of protection around it. It also established state-owned financial 
institutions to provide the private sector cheap and long-term capital. 
And, for a time, Pakistan operated a dual exchange rate system that 
gave rich incentives to those who set up import-substituting industries 
while punishing those who wanted to sell their products in the 
international market. In the two-year period between 1972 and 1974 
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, an avowed socialist, took Pakistan in a sharply 
different direction. He undertook a program of extensive 
nationalization of private assets soon after assuming office and took 
control of 31 large-scale industries, virtually all financial institutions, 
all large-scale trading companies and eventually even small agro-
production enterprises. By the middle of the 1970’s, the grip of the 
Pakistani state on the economy was as tight as the hold of the state in 
India.37
                                                
37 South Asian free trade area, opportunities and challenges: U.S. Agency for International Development 
USAID, 2004.
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Mujibur Rahman, the first President of Bangladesh nationalized all 
industries and brought bureaucratic socialism. Thus, by about the mid-
1970s, South Asia had closed itself off to the outside world. 
In 1980 the late President of Bangladesh Ziaur Rahman first proposed 
regional cooperation in South Asia.38 Several factors influenced 
President Ziaur Rahman’s thinking about establishing regional 
organization in South Asia39. The smaller countries of the region 
(Nepal, Bhutan, Maldives and Sri Lanka) promptly accepted the 
proposal of regional cooperation however India and Pakistan were 
skeptical initially. Indian policy makers apprehension that regional 
organization might prove an opportunity for the small neighbours to 
regionalize all bilateral issues and to join with each other to ‘gang up’ 
                                                
38 Kishore C Dash, The Political economy of Regional Cooperation in South Asia, Pacific Affairs, (Vol. 69, 
No.2, summer 1996), p.186.
39 Firstly change in the political leadership in the South Asian countries and demonstration of 
accommodative diplomacy by the new leaders; secondly Ziaur Rahman’s need for Indian support to 
legitimise his coup d’etat regime; thirdly, an acute balance of payment crisis of almost all the South Asian 
countries, which was further aggravated by the second oil crisis in 1979; fourthly failure of the North-
South dialogues and increasing protectionism by the developed countries; fifthly publication of an 
extremely useful background report by the Committee on Studies for Cooperation in Development in 
South Asia (CSCD), identifying many feasible areas of cooperation; sixthly assurance of economic 
assistance of multilateral cooperative projects on sharing water resources of Ganges and Brahmaputra by 
the United States President Jimmy Carter and British Prime Minister James Callaghan during their visit to 
South Asia in 1978 and seventh the soviet military intervention in Afghanistan in late December 1979 
resulting in rapid deterioration of the South Asian security situation (S D Muni and Anuradha Muni, 
Regional Cooperation in South Asia (New Delhi: National Publishing House, 1984), pp. 29-31)
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against India.40 Pakistan also feared that it might be an Indian 
strategy to organize other South Asian countries against Pakistan and 
ensure a regional market for Indian products, thereby consolidating 
and further strengthening India’s economic dominance in the region.41
Nevertheless SAARC was finally established in 1985 comprising 
Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka.42
Former President Bill Clinton described South Asia as the most 
dangerous place on earth on the eve of two emerging antagonistic 
nuclear powers.43
Fortunately, this has begun to change. Larger countries in the region 
are now reasonably open to international trade. In 2000, Sri Lanka 
was the most open, with trade-to-GDP ratio of 77 percent44. The 
corresponding ratio for Nepal was 44 percent; for Bangladesh and 
Pakistan, 33 percent; and for India 19 percent45. India’s greater 
openness was prompted by the foreign exchange crisis in 1991 and 
                                                
40 Dash, The Political economy of Regional Cooperation in South Asia, p. 187.
41 W. Howard Wiggins with F. Gregory Gause, III, Terrence P. Lyonss, and Evelyn Colbert, Dynamics of 
Regional Politics: Four Systems on the Indian Ocean Rim (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), 
p.132; Thomas Perry Thornton, ‘Regional Organisation in Conflict Management’, The Journals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 518 (November, 1991), p. 136.
42 First Declarations of the South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation: 7-8 December 1985, Dhaka, 
Bangladesh. http://www.saarc-sec.org/
43 Maleeha Lodhi, ‘Viewpoint: Security Challenges in South Asia’ The Non-proliferation Review, Summer 
2001, p. 118.
44 ADB, Asian Development Outlook - 2004, Asian Development Bank, Manila, April 28, 2004, P. 32.
45 Ibid.
U0621399
23
the prodding of the IMF, which had developed a new approach,
subsumed by most commentators under the term “the Washington 
Consensus.”46
According to Joseph Stiglitz, “the Washington Consensus policies were 
designed to respond to the very real problems in Latin America, and 
made considerable sense…When trade liberalization—the lowering of 
tariffs and elimination of other protectionist measures—is done the 
right way and at the right pace, so that new jobs are created as 
inefficient jobs are destroyed, there can be significant efficiency 
gains”47. Unlike some Latin America countries, South Asian countries 
did not rush to implement these policies. In the 1950’s trade optimists 
were export pessimists and did not anticipate that Korea’s exports 
would grow four times as fast as world trade during the next thirty 
years48. In 1970, Korea’s trade-to-GDP ratio was 0.32; it increased to 
0.66 in 1988. For Malaysia, another miracle economy, the ratio in the 
same period increased from 0.89 to 1.0949. The East Asian economic 
                                                
46  The Washington consensus is a phrase initially coined in 1987-88 by John Williamson to describe a 
relatively specific set of ten economic policy prescriptions that he considered to constitute a “standard” 
reform package promoted for crisis- wracked countries by Washington-based institutions such as the IMF, 
WB and U.S. treasury Department. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Washington_Consensus
47 Stiglitz, Joseph. 2003. Globalization and Its Discontents. Norton: New York.2003, p145.
48 Ibid.
49 ibid.
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miracle had a profound impact on the thinking of policymakers in 
South Asia. 
According to a recent World Bank study50 Pakistan and Sri Lanka are 
now the least protected markets in the region with average customs 
duty of 18.8 percent for Pakistan; Bangladesh is the region’s most 
protected economy with a total protection rate of 26.5 percent. The 
total value of regional trade increased rapidly in the late 1980s and 
most of 1990s but not the share of regional trade in totals trade. The 
United States was the major importer of South Asian goods and 
commodities; it accounted for 36 percent of Bangladesh’s total 
exports, 29 percent of Pakistan’s, and 21 percent of India’s. There was 
a different pattern for the points of origin for South Asian imports. For 
both Bangladesh and Pakistan, the single most important source of 
imports is China. For India, the United States is the largest single 
supplier.51
It would appear from the structure of South Asian trade that the 
“gravity model”52 has not worked for the region. Among the three 
approaches to increasing trade among countries, purists prefer 
unilateral action not contingent on the granting of reciprocity by 
                                                
50 World Bank. 2004b. Global Economic Prospects: Trade, Regionalism and Development. Washington 
D.C.
51 Supra 37
52 The gravity model of trade predicts bilateral trade flows based on the economic sizes of (often using 
GDP measurements) and distance between two units. The model was first used by Jan Tinbergen in 1962. 
www.wilkipedia.org
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trading partners.53 The second-best approach is to conduct 
negotiations on removing barriers to cross-border trade in the context 
of multilateral discussions. According to this line of thinking, the least 
satisfactory approach is to start with regional integration as the first 
step in easing constraints on global trade. If SAFTA succeeds in its 
aims, the economic and trading system that existed in British India 
could very well be restored. But it was politics that severed these 
links; it will take politics to restore them.54
6. Regional Economic Integration Attempts:
Compared to other regional blocs, the performance of SAARC is 
gloomy. Steps towards formal economic cooperation were made with 
the signing of the SAPTA in 1993. SAPTA did not achieve much either 
in terms of increasing intra-regional trade in South Asia. Intra-SAARC 
trade, as a percentage of South Asia’s world trade, increased from 
2.42% ($1.59 billion) in 1990 to 4.56% ($6.53 billion) in 2001 and 
marginally improved to 4.7% by 2003. This slight increase has been 
mostly attributed to rapid liberalization under bilateral trade 
agreements and WTO regimes, rather than to SAPTA. The failure of
SAPTA is also reflected in the skewed pattern of trade in the region, 
                                                
53 The economist Jagdish Bhagwati is one of the most articulate exponents of this view. For his approach 
to international trade see his recent, In Defense of Globalization, New York: Oxford, 2004.
54 Supra 37
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since India has not fully integrated into the region. But for the first 
time India is pushing SAFTA which was mooted in 2002, and 
culminated into an agreement in January 2004 and expected to come 
into force from January 1, 2006 upon completion of all formalities.55
BIMSTEC 56covers a population of approximately 1.3 billion and 
combined GDP of about $1.3 trillion. Broad sectors for cooperation
identified at the First Summit level meeting held in July 2004 covered 
trade and investment, technology, tourism, transport and 
communication, energy, and fisheries. For India, BIMSTEC resolves the 
problem of slow movement in South Asian cooperation by eliminating 
Pakistan and including Myanmar and Thailand. In 2004, BIMSTEC 
member countries agreed to establish the BIMSTEC Free Trade Area
Framework Agreement for a free trade area in goods, services and 
investments. 
There are also sub-regional and bilateral initiatives aimed at 
liberalizing trade among SAARC countries and promoting trade and 
investment facilitation efforts. Among the important sub-regional 
                                                
55 South Asian Regional Trade Agreements: Perspectives, Issues and Options, Jayanta Roy. Principal
Advisor, Confederation of Indian Industry, India June 20, 2005.
56 This agreement includes Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Myanmar, Bhutan and Thailand. 
www.bimstec.org
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initiatives are Bangladesh-Bhutan-India-Nepal Growth Quadrangle 
Initiative (BBIN-GQ) and Bangladesh-India-Sri Lanka –Thailand 
Economic Cooperation (BIST-EC).57
7. Trade Facilitation:
Trade facilitation includes port reform, modernization, streamlining 
regulatory requirements and harmonizing standards, as well as 
customs regimes, expanding the use of information technology to 
lower trade transactions costs.58 Security is also an important part of 
trade facilitation in modern commerce. The International Maritime 
Organization (IMO) developed the International Ship and Port Security 
Code (ISPS) which was adopted by more than 100 countries, and went 
into effect on 1 July, 2004. On July 31, 2004, WTO members reached 
consensus to launch negotiations on trade facilitation. The negotiations 
will focus specifically on three articles59 of GATT.60
                                                
57 Research and Information System for the Non-Aligned and Other Developing Countries (RIS) (2004). 
South Asia Development and Cooperation Report 2004. New Delhi, India. 
58 World Bank (2004a). Global Economic Prospects – Realizing the Development Promise of the Doha 
Agenda 2004. Washington, D.C.: World Bank. 
59 This includes Article V (freedom of transit) which relates to conditions in which the transit of goods is 
free from barriers to transport and discrimination among suppliers, firms, and traders. GATT Article VIII 
(fees and formalities on imports and exports) addresses customs clearance procedures and a commitment 
of non-discrimination and transparency in fees and rules applied to goods crossing borders. GATT Article X 
(publication and administration of trade regulations) includes commitments to assist in ensuring timely 
publication of regulations on imports, including fees, customs valuation procedures, and other rules. It 
also includes obligations to maintain transparent administrative procedures for disputes in customs.
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7.1 Measuring the Impact of Trade Facilitation:
Walkenhorst and Yasui 61(2003) point out that the degree of potential 
benefits of trade facilitation varies across countries, sectors, and types 
of traders.62 A study by APEC (1999) finds that “shock” reduction in 
trade costs from trade facilitation efforts vary from 1 percent of import 
prices for industrial countries and the newly industrializing countries of 
Korea, Chinese Taipei and Singapore, to 2 percent for other developing 
countries.63 The study estimates that effects of APEC trade 
liberalization and facilitation would increase the volume of APEC 
merchandise exports in 1996 by 3.3 percent.
Maskus, Wilson, and Otsuki64 evaluated that the gains to trade 
facilitation related to harmonized regulations and standards. According 
                                                                                                                                                
60 Trade Facilitation and Regional Integration in South Asia: Accelerating the Gains to Trade with Capacity 
Building, The World Bank/ International Monetary Fund, 2004 Annual Meetings, Program of Seminars, 
October 1, 2004, Washington, D.C. 
61 Walkenhorst, Peter and Tadashi Yasui (2003). “Quantitative Assessment of the Benefits of Trade 
Facilitation.” TD/TC/WP2003(31)/FINAL. (13 November). Paris: OECD. 
http://www.olis.oecd.org/olis/2003doc.nsf/43bb6130e5e86e5fc12569fa005d004c/ec8dd2cee8fca29ac125
6ddd0055e57b/$FILE/JT00153655.PDF  
62 For instance, the authors mention that trade transaction costs (TTCs) range from 1-15 percent of 
traded goods depending on country’s pre-trade facilitation condition. Furthermore, border costs for agro-
food products are 50 percent higher than those for manufacturing products, and that TTCs for small 
medium enterprises are 50 percent higher than those for big enterprises. 
63 A Review of Cross-border Mergers and Acquisitions in APEC, by Chunlai Chen and Christopher Findlay. 
www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1046/j.1467-8411.2003.00129.x
64 Maskus, Keith E., John S. Wilson and Tsunehiro Otsuki (2001). “An Empirical Framework for Analyzing 
Technical Regulations and Trade,” in Quantifying the impact of technical barriers to trade: Can it be done? 
Keith Maskus and John S. Wilson eds., University of Michigan Press, 2001. 
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to Moenius65 bilaterally shared standards raise trade volume, and 
therefore, harmonization of standards promotes trades. Baier and 
Bergstrand66  find that 8-9 percent of the average growth in real 
bilateral trade flows among 16 OECD countries increased because of 
transport-cost reductions. UNCTAD shown that 1 percent reduction in 
the cost of maritime and air transport services could increase Asian 
GDP by some US $3.3 billion, 1 percent improvement in wholesale and 
retail trade services would lead to an additional gain of US$3.6 
billion.67 Hummels concluded that each day saved in shipping time in 
part due to a faster customs clearance is worth 0.5 percent reduction 
of tariff.68 The Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and 
Chinese Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (2001) 
suggested that moving to electronic documentation for trade would 
result in a cost savings of some “1.5 to 15 percent of the landed cost 
of an imported item.”69 If a simple average of a 3 percent reduction in 
landed costs were applied to intra-Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
                                                
65 Moenius, Johannes (2004). “Information versus Product Adaptation: The Role of Standards in Trade.” 
Kellogg School of Management Northwestern University. 
66 Baier, S.L. and J.H. Bergstrand (2001). “The Growth of World Trade: Tariffs, Transport Costs, and 
Income Similarity.” Journal of International Economics, February 53(1): 1-27.
67 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (2001). E-Commerce and Development Report. 
UNCTAD: Geneva. 
68 Hummels, David L. (2001). “Time as a Trade Barrier.” (mimeo). Department of Economics. Purdue 
University, Lafayette, Ind. http://www.eiit.org/ConfInfo/2000Papers/hummels.pdf 
69 www.yearbook.org.cn/english/yearbook_view/1999/1999contents.htm
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(APEC) merchandise trade, the gross savings from electronic 
documentation could be US$60 billion.70
Wilson, Mann, and Otsuki found that enhanced capacity in global trade 
facilitation would increase world trade of manufacturing goods by 
approximately $377 billion dollars – an increase of about 9.7 
percent.71 They found that the improvement in customs environment 
results in about $107 billion (0.8 percent) gain. The gain from the 
improvement in regulatory environment is $83 billion. The largest gain 
comes from improvements in services sector infrastructure and e-
business usage ($154 billion or 4.0 percent). 
7.2 Overview the Conditions in South Asia:
Article 3 of SAFTA included plans to integrate transport systems and 
harmonize standards in the region. India has specifically indicated 
interest in providing the “main technical support and other trade 
facilitation steps in the field of harmonization of customs procedures 
and standards for products of trade interest to the region”72. Some 
experts expect the SAFTA to be “a step towards better physical, 
industrial and communication infrastructure development in the 
                                                
70 Supra 55.
71 Wilson, John S., Catherine Mann, and Tsunehiro Otsuki (2004) “Assessing the Potential Benefit of 
Trade Facilitation: A Global Perspective” World Bank Working Paper 3224.
72 Hindu Business Line, May 11, 2000.
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region”73. In order to highlight conditions in South Asia it is useful to 
compare the region’s performance. 
(1) Port Infrastructure and Efficiency 
Air and maritime ports in South Asia are generally considered less 
competitive than those in East Asia. It takes only a couple of hours at 
the port of Singapore or Laem Chaband in Thailand to clear a vessel
Whereas 2 to 3 days in chittagong ports in Bangladesh.74  30-35 days
need for goods shipped via container from U.S. to Pakistan. At 
Jawaharlal Nehru port in India about 75 percent of calls are direct, for 
example, averages $20,000 for a call by a 4000 TEU ship. Cargo dwell 
time at the Dehli airport averages 2.5 days where the norm is 12 
hours.75 At Nhava Sheva port in India, exporters are “estimated to lose 
around Rs 800 core a month because of delayed shipments.”76 Due to 
congestion an exporter had to send his consignment by air, which cost 
“40 per cent of the value of the product”77. Regional seaports do not 
operate on a fixed day-of-the-week schedule which can cause delays 
                                                
73 Nayar, Lola (2004). “SAFTA a Step Forward for Regional Development: Experts.” South Asia Monitor. 
(August 5). 
74 Ibid.
75 Roy, Jayanta (2004) “Consequences and Benefits of Implementing a Multilateral Approach to Trade 
Facilitation,”: World Bank Seminar, Dakar.
76 August 6, 2004, Business Standard, India.
77 Business Standard (2004). “Nhava Sheva Port in Jam.” Business Standard. (August 6). Mumbai. 
http://www.businessstandard.com/common/storypage.php?hpFlag=Y&chklogin=N&autono=163402&leftn
m=lmnu2&lselect=0&leftindx=2
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and uncertainty. Subramanian and Arnold78 highlighted the problem of 
excessive delays in moving cargo through the ports of Calcutta and 
Chittagong in Bangladesh and the associated impact on trade. 
(2) Land Transportation 
The lack of cross border transit points and road connections across the 
region are significant hindrances to intra-regional trade.79 Goods 
moving between India and Pakistan are often transshipped through a 
third country. Lack of integrated transport networks in the region 
clearly raised cargo shipping costs. This is a critical problem 
particularly for landlocked countries, including Afghanistan, Bhutan, 
and Nepal. In addition, labor strikes cause delayed in transit and 
congestion in land transport networks. Inland roads are a major means 
of moving goods across South Asia and India has “an extensive 3.3 
million km road network making it one of the largest in the world”80. A 
number of road corridors in the region were not maintained and are of 
limited capacity.81 This makes it expensive to move commodities 
across long distances with countries imposing load limits. For example, 
in India the percentage of paved roads at 56 percent is lower that than 
                                                
78 Subramanian, Uma and John Arnold (2001). “Forging Subregional Links in Transportation and Logistics 
in South Asia.” (January). Washington, D.C.: World Bank. 
79 World Bank (2004b). “Trade and Regional Cooperation between Afghanistan and Its Neighbours.” 
Report No. 26769. (February 18). Washington, D.C.
80 Supra 60
81 Supra 66
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in countries of East Asia which averages 88 percent. The average 
transport costs on the Kolkata-Petrapole route between Bangladesh 
and India is Rs 2543 which is about 40 percent higher than other 
highways82. A carpet manufacture in Kathnabdu reported that because 
of the poor quality of the local roads, it must “repair one of its vehicles 
every week and spends NRs 100,000 a year on maintenance"83. Other 
restrictions are based in licensing restrictions, for example foreign 
trucks are not permitted to enter Bangladesh. 
India railway network has moved to electrify tracks and convert from 
meter gauge to broad gauge to harmonize its system infrastructure.84
Freight accounts for 41% of traffic units on India’s railway system, 
however, 76% of traffic on China’s.85 The railways in India and 
Bangladesh suffer from “over-staffing, poor maintenance, and old 
rolling stock”86. 
(3) Border Crossings and Customs 
                                                
82 Das and Pohit, 2004.
83 Biggs, Tyler et al. (2000). “Pilot Investment Climate Assessment: The Business Environment and 
Manufacturing Performance in Nepal.” World Bank Regional Program for Enterprise Development and 
Federation of Nepalese Chambers of Commerce and Industry. 
84 United Nations Economic and Social Commission in Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP) (2001). “Part Five: 
Logistics, Transport Facilitation and Multimodal Transport.” Review of Developments in Transport and 
Communications in the ESCAP Region 1996-2001 Asia and the Pacific. New York: United Nations. 
http://www.unescap.org/tctd/pubs/review2001toc.htm
85 Supra 64
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Some border crossings do not have customs facilities87. Problems arise 
when customs clearance centers are located far away from border 
crossing. For instance, the sanitary and phytosanitary testing 
laboratory in Calcutta is located one thousand kilometers from the 
customs facility at Birgunj, Nepal. Exporters have to pay additional 
fees for vehicle detention charges for weeks while waiting for test 
results88. 
Poor management at customs is another issue. At the India-
Bangladesh border a consignment needs at least 22 documentations, 
more than 55 signatures, and minimum 116 copies for the final 
approval89. Furthermore, the region uses different product 
classification systems for commodities: the Standard International 
Trade Classification is used by Pakistan and the Harmonization System 
(HS) by other countries90. There are other administrative problems 
with customs that includes limitations on staff working hours, lack of 
uniformly applied import duty rates, etc. India launched a 
modernization project in customs which includes leveraging Electronic 
Data Interchange (EDI) technology, which allowed exchanging 
                                                
87 ibid
88 Karmacharya, Binod K.(2002). “Facilitating Trade in SASEC Region in the Perspective of Recent 
Developments: A Case Study of India and Nepal.” Paper presented for Asian Development Bank: South 
Asia Business Forum (SABF), South Asia Sub-regional Economic Cooperation (SASEC), 12-13 August 
2002, New Delhi, India. 
89 Supra 60
90 Supra 22
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documents and forms electronically, to streamline clearances. With 
assistance from the World Bank, Pakistan started reforms in the 
Central Board of Revenue including customs offices and is expected to 
have a revenue increase by Rs.65 billion of in the fiscal year 2004-591. 
Pakistan also introduced electronic filing system at Port Qasim.92 In 
Bangladesh, the steps required for import and export clearance of 
fiber, fabric, and garments have been reduced by 75 percent93. 
Afghanistan is working on customs modernization in a new $31 million 
World Bank project. Nepal is currently undertaking reforms under a 
Three Year Customs Reform and Modernization Action Plan. The
reforms resulted in a revenue increase by Rs.900 million in the first six 
months of 2004 from the same period in the previous year94. 
South Asia can learn from experiences in East Asia, like Philippines’ 
modernization of customs. It was reported that customs clearance 
involved 10 separate documents in multiple copies, with over 90 steps, 
and more than 40 signatures.95 Implementing the ASYCUDA96 system 
                                                
91 Rizvi, Shamim Ahmed (2004). “Reforms in the CBR.” Pakistan Economist. (June 7-13). Islamabad. 
92 World Bank (2004a). Global Economic Prospects – Realizing the Development Promise of the Doha 
Agenda 2004. Washington, D.C.: World Bank. 
93 Ibid
94 Gorkhapatra Daily (2004). “Reform in Customs Boosts Revenue.” Gorkhapatra Daily. January 24. 
http://www.gorkhapatra.org.np/pageloader.php?file=2004/01/26/topstories/main3 
95  World Bank (2001). “E Government: Philippine Customs Reform.” (January 3). 
http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/egov/philippinecustomscs.htm 
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can reduce paper transactions. Another example is the customs 
administration reform in China in October 2003 at Shanghai port to 
reduce congestion and accelerate trade.97
(4) Information Technology and Services Sector Infrastructure 
Progress in information technology is as important as development of 
physical infrastructure. Biggs examine that in Nepal phone lines 
usually did not work well outside of the cities and Services did not 
available all day, and when available, voice quality is often poor.98  
Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)99 has targeted achieving 
paperless trading among all member countries by 2010. This is being 
advanced by computerizing custom procedures through United Nations 
Rules for Electronic Data Interchange for Administration Commerce 
and Transport (UN/EDIFACT) and reducing the number of documents 
required for sea, air and land transport. Vietnam marked a new 
progress in the process of modernization, simplification and 
                                                                                                                                                
96 The Automated System for Customs Data (ASYCUDA) has been a major driving force in the 
development of customs procedures and for foreign trade procedures. ASYCUDA has directed programs 
that are reforming the customs clearance process developed by UNCTAD.
97 Shanghai WTO Affairs Consultation Center (2003): “Chapter Seven Pudong’s Economic and Social 
development After China’s Accession to the WTO.” 
http://www.sccwto.net:7001/wto/english/shanghai2003_8.htm 
98 Biggs, Tyler et al. (2000). “Pilot Investment Climate Assessment: The Business Environment and 
Manufacturing Performance in Nepal.” World Bank Regional Program for Enterprise Development and 
Federation of Nepalese Chambers of Commerce and Industry. 
99 www.apec.org
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harmonization of customs procedures.100 The overall savings from this 
paperless trading initiative is expected to be “between 1.5 to 15 per 
cent of the landed cost of an imported item.”101 World Bank Trade and 
Transport Facilitation in Southeast Europe (TTFSE)102 project on 
customs and border reform could also be considered as one model of 
reform for South Asia.103
7.3 Peace and economic integration: an analysis:
The spontaneous Indo-Pakistan tensions have put a damper on any 
kind of activities to increase the pace of economic integration and 
bring about peace in the region. But the "composite dialogue" between 
India and Pakistan over the past two years has led to the opening of 
bus and railway services, and dialogue over strategic issues on 
Siachen, Sir Creek and the future of divided Kashmir considered key 
areas of cooperation more openly than before. 
                                                
100 Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) (2003). “Vietnam Individual Action Plan: Customs 
Procedures.” http://www.apec-iap.org 
101 Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and Chinese Ministry of Foreign Trade and 
Economic Cooperation (2001). “Paperless Trading: Benefits to APEC.” Commonwealth of Australia. 
www.dfat.gov.au/publications/paperless/paperless_trading.pdf. 
102 www.ttfse.org
103 The Trade and Transport Facilitation in Southeast Europe Program initiated in 2000 by the national 
governments in Southeast Europe, the World Bank, and the United States in collaboration with the 
European Union. The project is aimed at reducing transport costs, eliminating corruption, and providing 
European Union-compatible customs standards, and some progress have been made. For details, see 
http://www.seerecon.org/ttfse/. 
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History shows that regional economic integration can be successful 
only if the countries concerned establish a commonality of political
purpose. France and Germany who fought three wars between 1871 
and 1945 was able to thaw differences through EEC. The Cold War 
gave western European nations another urgent reason to bind 
economically together to gain strategic strength. The same pattern is 
evident in the ASEAN, which was formed as a political grouping to 
oppose threat of Communist expansion from Vietnam and China.
It is a common phenomenon in international relations that a small 
neighbour had to live under fear when its large neighbour has 
‘expansionist’ policy and there are unresolved and complicating factors 
in their relations. This is particularly true in the case of South Asia as 
India continuously showed her hegemony towards her small 
neighbours rather than being regarded as ‘Big Brother’. Bhutan and 
Nepal are continuously living under this threat of becoming next 
Sikkim104. To create a sense of ‘easiness’ among her neighbour, the
former Indian Prime Minister I K Gujral adopted a doctrine called 
‘Gujral Doctrine’105 as a tool of conflict management in the region.106
                                                
104 Sikkim used to be a small state in North eastern part of India, which was ceded into it by force.
105 The Gujral Doctrine is a set of five principles to guide the conduct of foreign relations with India’s 
immediate neighbours These principles are: first, with neighbours like Bangladesh, Bhutan,Maldives, Nepal 
and Sri Lanka, India does not ask for reciprocity, but gives and accommodates what it can in good faith 
and trust; second, no South Asian country should allow its territory to be used against the interest of 
another country of the region; third, no country should interfere in the internal affairs of another; fourth, 
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But in reality growing political strife and bureaucratic obstacles 
indicates that non-tariff barriers in the form of political disputes, 
bureaucratic delays and interference by the intelligence agencies have 
been obstructing trade between India and Pakistan. There are growing 
concern that regionalism in South Asia might end up as Pandora’s box 
if concerned efforts are not made beyond the turmoil of political 
exigencies. 
SAARC members will have to agree on a common import policy, either 
formally or informally and no country will retain sovereignty over the 
import policy. However, it felt that unless countries of a region enjoy
considerable political harmony, they cannot possibly agree on 
concessions like surrendering sovereignty over their import policy. This 
is particularly true in South Asia where Indian economy dominated
overall regional outcomes.107 So, although economic cooperation and 
even integration is very desirable in South Asia there is a call for
creating a politically harmonious subcontinent, which is an extremely 
formidable task.
                                                                                                                                                
all South Asian countries must respect each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty; and, finally, they 
should settle all their disputes through peaceful bilateral negotiations.
106 Padma Murthy, The Gujral Doctrine and Beyond, Strategic Analysis; A monthly Journal of the IDSA, 
July 1999 (Vol. XXIII No. 4).
107 Ghanshyam N. Singh (ed), The Economy of the SAARC Nations, (New Delhi: Anmol Publications, 
1993).
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After 2006 so many things changed and now South Asia begins to 
think immense about itself as a region. The proposal to set up a South 
Asian University is the best example, since it would require nothing 
short of $1 billion to do so.108 The business community is thinking 
even further ahead of the governments in the region. In anticipation of 
SAFTA, the TATA group of India has already proposed a $3 billion 
investment in Bangladesh in gas-based fertilizer, power and steel 
plants. The reconstituted Independent South Asia Commission on 
Poverty Alleviation (ISCAPA) has adopted a more reasonable approach 
by suggesting a 24-point approach for halving poverty in South Asia 
by 2010, as opposed to MDG of the UNDP that requires South Asia to 
do so by 2015.109 After years of discussion, and, to some extent, a 
large degree of negligence, the South Asian Development Fund is also 
making some headway, with assets amounting to around 
$300,000,000.110 South Asia receives around $32 billion annually in 
remittances, by exporting labour to the Gulf region and the East and 
Southeast Asian countries.111 In Pakistan, remittance increased four-
fold, from just over $1 billion in 2001 to over $4 billion in 2003; in 
Bangladesh, it increased from $1.9 to $3.3 billion; in India, it 
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111 World Bank's Global Economic Prospect report for 2006.
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increased from $12 to $21.7 billion, and Nepal receives $1.5 billion.112
From 12 June India Bangladesh railway service will be restored, 
though bus services exist between the countries from 1996. 
8. Necessary conditions for a successful PTA:
Economic trade theory indicates a number of criteria likely to increase 
the probability that a FTAs will result in welfare gains and economic 
growth. Key criteria include the following seven113:
1. Geographical proximity. 
2. High pre-FTAs tariffs. 
3. High intraregional trade levels. 
4. Trade complementarities. 
5. Low political tensions. 
6. Streamlined market access for goods produced. 
7. Low non-tariff barriers (NTB).114
8.1 South Asian position:
Proximity has not worked in South Asia; intraregional trade is an 
insignificant component of total trade. This “inverse” regionalism is not
necessarily the result of political problems between India and 
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113 How desirable is the South Asian free trade area? A quantitative assessment: Jayatilleke S Bandara 
and Wusheng Yu, NJF Seminar No. 325, August 17-18, 2001, Helsinki.
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Pakistan115. In the three large countries in the region (Bangladesh, 
India and Pakistan), tariffs is still higher than Southeast Asian 
countries116. 
Because of illegal across-border trade intra-regional trade in South 
Asia is insignificant. The share of intra-regional trade in South Asia’s 
total trade declined from 3.5 per cent to 2.4 between 1970 and 1990, 
it showed a moderate rise from 2.4 per cent in 1990 to 4.6 in 1999.117
The other important trend is India’s growing trade surplus with other 
SAARC countries. The share of India's exports to the region increased 
from 3.9 per cent in 1970 to 5.5 per cent in 1999; its import share 
from the region declined from 1.4 per cent to 0.9 per cent during the 
same period.118 This will also be a major concern for other member 
countries and certainly is not a good sign of promoting overall intra-
regional trade in South Asia.119
                                                
115 Lahiri, S. (1998) "Controversy: Regionalism Versus Multilaterlism", The Economic Journal, Vol 108, 
1126-1127.
116 Panagariya, A. (1999) Trade Lberalisation in South Asia: Recent Liberalisation and Future Agenda, 
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Despite some limitations, trade complementarity indices developed by 
Drysdale120 can be used to check the existence of trade 
complementarity in South Asia. There was a lack of strong trade 
complementarity in the bilateral trade structures of South Asia. This 
point is supported by an early study of Aggarwal and Pandey121 (1992) 
and a recent study of Samaratunga122 (1999).
South Asian countries are producing and trading similar commodities. 
To identify different country’s competitiveness among different 
commodity groups, the Export Revealed Comparative Advantage 
indices (XRCA) have been estimated by two recent studies for 
commodities at the three-digit level using recent UN trade data123. The 
results of the above two studies indicate that countries in South Asia 
have an almost identical pattern of comparative advantage in a 
relatively narrow band of commodities and that these countries do not 
have comparative advantages in a wide range of capital goods and 
advanced manufactured products. 
                                                
120 Drysdale, P. D. (1969) “Japan and Australia: The Prospect for Closer Economic Integration”, Economic 
Papers, Vol. 30, pp. 12-28.
121 Aggarawal, M. and Pandey, P. (1992) "Prospects of Trade Expansion in the SAARC Region", The 
Developing Economies, Vol. 30, No. 1, pp.
122 Samaratunga, R. H. S. (1999) Essays in Trade Policy and Economic Integration with Special Reference 
to South Asia, Unpublished PhD Thesis, La Trobe University, Melbourne
123 ibid.
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9. INTERNATIONAL TRADE FACILITATION INDICATORS:
International comparisons of economic and commercial conditions 
from the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report 
2004-2005 (GCR)124 provides detailed figures for 104 countries, four of 
them SAFTA members—India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka. 
The GCR’s figures give not only a sense of the range of conditions 
among SAFTA countries, but also how these countries compare with 
the rest of the world. 
9.1 Hidden Trade Barriers:
The GCR125 survey asked respondents to rank hidden trade barriers on 
a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 important and 7 not important. The SAFTA 
countries’ ranks are as follows in 2006:
i. Global Competitiveness Index rankings:
Country point Rank 
India 4.44 43
Sri Lanka 3.87 79
Pakistan 3.66 91
Bangladesh 3.46 99
ii. Country hidden trade barriers Index Rank:126
                                                
124 World Economic Forum. 2002. Global Competitiveness Report. Geneva. 
www.us.oup.com/us/pdf/reports/gcrexecutivesummary.pdf
www.weforum.org/en/initiatives/gcp/Global%20Competitiveness%20Report/index.htm
125 http://www.weforum.org/en/initiatives/gcp/Global%20Competitiveness%20Report/index.htm
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Sri Lanka 4.9 35
India 4.7 42
Pakistan 3.8 75
Bangladesh 3.8 76 
India’s and Sri Lanka’s scores reflect views on the extent of hidden 
trade barriers that are slightly better than the global mean, while 
Pakistan and Bangladesh fall below the mean.
iii. Business Impact of Customs Procedures127
Country Index Rank
Sri Lanka 3.9 54
India 3.6 68
Pakistan 2.9 92
Bangladesh 2.8 96
The South Asian countries score below the global mean, indicating 
negative impacts on business from customs operations. Customs in 
Pakistan and Bangladesh have among the strongest negative impacts 
on business in the world.
iv. Efficiency of Custom Procedures:
Country Index Rank128
Sri Lanka 3.4 54
                                                                                                                                                
126 Global Competitiveness Report 2004-2005 (GCR)
127 ibid
128 ibid
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India 3.4 55
Pakistan 2.5 88
Bangladesh 2.2 100
The highest score was 6.7 and the lowest 1.8; the standard was 3.7. 
Once again, Sri Lanka and India are just slightly below the global 
mean while Pakistan and Bangladesh are near the bottom of global 
rankings. 
v. Business Impact of Rules on Foreign Direct Investment:
Country Index Rank129
India 5.1 28
Pakistan 5.0 33
Sri Lanka 5.0 36
Bangladesh 4.8 53
The highest score was 6.4 and the worst, 2.8; the mean was 4.8. All 
South Asian countries scored at or above the global mean in this area, 
reflecting the efforts of the past decade to reform the environment for 
foreign investment. India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka are in the top third 
of all countries.
vi. Infrastructure Quality Overall:
Country Index Rank130
India 2.7 63
                                                
129 ibid
130 ibid
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Pakistan 2.8 77
Sri Lanka 2.7 79
Bangladesh 2.4 99
The best score was 6.8 and the worst, 1.5; the mean was 4.0. In this 
case, all four countries score well below the global mean, reflecting the 
substantial shortcomings in the general quality of infrastructure 
throughout the region. 
vii. Port Infrastructure:
Country Index Rank131
Sri Lanka 3.5 60
India 3.3 65
Bangladesh 2.5 86
Pakistan 2.4 88
The highest score was 6.8 and the worst, 1.5; the mean was 4.0. The 
below average scores for port infrastructure are consistent with the 
negative findings for infrastructure generally. The quality of port 
services determines a great deal of trade transaction costs because all 
the countries in the region depend primarily on sea transport for 
foreign trade.132
10. Review of selected studies:
                                                
131 ibid.
132 Facilitating Regional Trade under SAFTA, James W. Robertson
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Jayaraman133 examined that gains from a South Asian PTA would be 
insignificant for small nations. Rahman concluded that small countries 
like Nepal and SriLanka would lose welfare as a result of the custom 
union. DeRosa and Govindan134 suggest that welfare gains may 
increase significantly as a result of much broader trade liberalization
with other parts of the world. Srinivasan and Canonero135 recommend
that the unilateral trade liberalization would yield much more gains for 
the region compared to gains from preferential trade liberalization. 
Small economies in the region gain much more from preferential trade 
liberalization than larger economies. Pigato136 used the global CGE 
model137 and found that SAPTA would create some welfare gains for its 
member countries. However, unilateral trade liberalization would 
create larger gains for the region. The creation of SAFTA “would be 
highly desirable” and “economic gains would be significant, especially 
for the smaller countries and reduce political and border tension in the 
region”. 
                                                
133 Jayaraman, T. K. (1978) Economic Cooperation in the Indian Sub-continent - A Customs Union 
Approach, Orient Longman, New Delhi.
134 DeRosa, D.A. and K. Govindan (1996) “Agriculture, Trade, and Regionalism in South Asia”, Journal of 
Asian Economics, Vol. 7. No.2, pp.293-316
135 Srinivasan, T.N. and G. Canonero (1993) “Preferential Agreements in South Asia: Theory, Empirics 
and Policy”, Yale Growth Centre, Yale University (mimeographed) (as cited in Pigato, et al, 1997).
136 Pigato, M., Farah, C., Itakura, K., Jun, K., Martin, W., Murrell, K. and T.G. Srinivasan (1997) South 
Asia’s Integration into the World Economy, World Bank, Washington, D.C.
137 Hertel, T.W. (ed) (1997) Global Trade Analysis: Modeling and Applications. Cambridge University 
Press. 
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In contrast to the above studies some observers have a much more 
negative view on SAFTA. Panagariya138 rejects the idea that forming 
SAFTA is beneficial for the region and argues that “it is in the region’s 
interest to push ahead with its non-discriminatory liberalization rather 
than promote trade preferences”. Panagariya139 points out that this is 
a misguided argument and SAFTA is “likely to become a binding 
constraint on true, nondiscriminatory liberalization”. He uses examples 
of Mexico and Brazil joining the Southern American Common Market 
(MERCOSUR) and states that these two countries have reviewed in this 
section have contributed valuable inputs to the debate on the 
desirability of SAFTA. 
Three different viewpoints on SAFTA can be summarized as follows:
(a) Optimistic View: This group believes that the SAFTA would be 
"highly desirable" and economic gains would be significant, especially 
for small economies in the region. South Asian politicians and many 
bureaucrats hold this view. 
                                                
138 Panagariya, A. (2000). "Preferential Trade Liberalization: The Traditional Theory and New 
Development", Journal of Economic Literature, XXXVIII (2): 287-331.
139 Panagariya, A. (1999) Trade Lberalisation in South Asia: Recent Liberalisation and Future Agenda, 
The World Economy, Vol. 22, No. 3, pp.353-378.
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(b) Pessimistic View: This group believes that the SAFTA is "highly 
undesirable" and it will lead to trade diversion and slow down of 
unilateral trade liberalization.
(c) Moderate or Intermediate View: This group believes that potential 
gains from SAFTA, though less than those from unilateral 
liberalization, are significant for small countries in the region and 
preferential trade liberalization is good as part of a coordinated 
liberalization in countries in the region, and it will lead to unilateral 
trade liberalization.
11. SAFTA:
The SAFTA agreement covers tariff reductions, rules of origin, 
safeguards, institutional structures, and dispute settlement. It also 
calls for the adoption of various trade facilitation measures. The SAFTA 
tariff reduction program stipulates average weighted tariffs of no more 
than 20 percent by the region’s more developed economies—India, 
Pakistan, and Sri Lanka—within two years of the entry into force of the 
agreement. Within five years after the completion of the first phase, 
India and Pakistan will adjust their tariffs to the 0 to 5 percent range. 
The region’s least developed countries (LDC) Bangladesh, Bhutan, 
Maldives, and Nepal are required to have average weighted tariffs of 
no more than 30 percent within two years, but would be allowed 
longer periods for the second downward adjustment: Sri Lanka in six 
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years and Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives and Nepal in eight years. 
India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka will reduce their tariffs to the agreed 
low levels on imports from other countries no later than January 1, 
2009. The agreement also calls for eliminating quantitative restrictions 
for products on the tariff liberalization list.
While member states have been allowed to develop lists of sensitive 
items that would not be subjected fully to the stipulated tariff cuts, the 
number of products to be included in the country lists would be subject 
to review every four years. A Ministerial Council will be the highest 
decision-making authority while a Committee of Experts (COE) will 
monitor implementation of the agreement and resolve disputes. The 
COE will report to the ministers every six months on the progress of 
the agreement. The agreement is to be fully implemented by 2015.140
11.1 TRADE FACILITATION PROVISIONS IN THE SAFTA
TREATY:
SAFTA seeks to change the emphasis of SAARC economic regional 
cooperation from a policy of sustenance141 to actively enhancing142 it. 
SAFTA’s ambitions extend to increasing the scope of the South Asian 
                                                
140 Details are from the SAARC Ministerial Declaration, January 2004. 
141 Article 2(1) SAPTA
142 Article 2 of SAFTA
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regional trade dialogue to include issues of competition143; trade and 
transport144 facilitation through progressive harmonization of 
legislation145; banking procedures146; macroeconomic consultations147; 
communications148; foreign exchange regulations149; and immigration 
(currently SAFTA is only concerned with the facilitation of business 
visas).150 SAFTA also introduces a specific Trade Liberalization 
Programme151 that phases down tariffs and eliminates quantitative 
restrictions in consonance with the obligations imposed by the WTO152. 
Article 20 of SAFTA also provides for a detailed dispute settlement 
mechanism under the auspices of a Council of Experts analogous to 
the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) of the WTO. SAFTA member 
countries agreed concerning trade facilitation in Article 3 of the SAFTA 
agreement.
11.2 Drawback of the Treaty:
A major drawback of the Treaty is the long time period that it 
envisages for establishing the Free Trade Area. Going by the past 
                                                
143 Art 3(1) (b) & 8(j)
144  Art 8(g) & (k)
145  Art 3(2) (e) & 8(a)-(e)
146  Art 8(f), Article 8(j) specifically mentions venture capital as being an issue for liberalization.
147 Art 8(i)
148 Art 8(k)
149 Art 8(l)
150 Art 8(m)
151 Art 7
152 Art 7(5)
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experience, the process can be derailed by any adverse development 
in the political relationship between the countries of the region.
Moreover, the long SAFTA process envisaged in the Treaty is likely to 
be overtaken by events at both bilateral and multilateral levels. Series 
of bilateral free trade agreements will make the SAFTA process 
redundant and same outcome can be expected because of the 
expected lowering of tariffs by further trade liberalization through 
negotiations under the WTO.
Another major deficiency and element of uncertainty in the SAFTA 
Agreement is the “sensitive” or negative lists of products. No datelines 
have been fixed for concluding the negotiations on these items. It does 
not subscribe categorically to the phasing out of the sensitive list. The 
Agreement only provides that the sensitive list “shall be reviewed after 
every 4 years --- with a view to reducing the number of items”. 
Moreover if the list is too long, it will limit the scope of free trade and 
detract from the provision of Article XXIV of GATT (1994) that a free 
trade area should cover “substantially all trade”. 
SAFTA Treaty does not include provisions for the liberalization of trade 
in Services which is a major lacuna. Services have become an 
important driver of the economies of SAARC countries accounting for 
nearly 50 percent of the GDP of most of these countries. It also leaves 
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out liberalization of investment in the region. It is a severe 
shortcoming because it is not possible to take full advantage of the 
enlargement of the market brought about by trade liberalization, 
without freer movement of capital. 
The SAFTA Treaty contains no specific provisions for deeper 
integration. The measures for deeper integration may come within the 
scope of its Article 8, under the title “Additional Measures”. However, 
this Article is couched in very general terms and implies no
commitments on the part of the member states to pursue any of the 
special measures listed under this Article and set up a mechanism for 
pursuing the additional measures.
11.3 SAARC FINANCE:
The 24th Session of the SAARC Council of Ministers held in Islamabad 
during January 2-3, 2004 recommended SAARC FINANCE to examine 
the concept of a South Asian Development Bank (SADB) and to study 
and make recommendations on early and eventual realization of a 
South Asian Economic Union (SAEU).153
11.4 Measure Economic Benefits from SAFTA:
                                                
153 SAPTA, SAFTA and Beyond, Hem Prasad Neupane
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 “A consensus has emerged among researchers that RTAs are trade 
creating”154. For instance, the share of NAFTA trade among the 
signatories’ total trade increased from less than 35 percent in the late 
1980s to almost 50 percent in 1999. Over the same period, the share 
of trade between members of MERCOSUR, compared to the parties’ 
total trade, doubled from 10 to 20 percent. In South Asia, if tariffs 
remain high on imports from outside the region than SAFTA would 
divert total trade. FDI has played a very important role in successful 
RTAs. South Asia needs more resources for investment than it can 
mobilize domestically. The corporate sector in South Asia has 
remained unaffected by developments in the global production system. 
According to a review of the changes in industrial processes by Alan 
Winters155, production chains and finer division of the production 
processes across countries, including developing countries, allows 
producers to exploit potential gains from (1) local increasing returns to 
scale in the production of intermediate inputs, (2) regional differences 
in factor costs for different components of the production process, (3) 
increasing competition arising from widening market, and (4) 
technology transfer from developed countries embedded in 
                                                
154 Ghosh, S. and S. Yamraik. Are Regional Trading Arrangements Trade Creating? An Analysis of 
Extreme Bounds Analysis: Journal of International Economics, 63, 369-95.
155 Winters, L. Alan. 2004. Trade Liberalization and Economic Performance: An Overview. The Economic 
Journal, 114 (February), pp. F4-F.
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intermediate inputs and backward linkages through exports.156 In most 
cases trade integration has allowed developing countries to specialize 
in their production systems. 
11.5 SAFTA’s Future:
RTAs often follow rather than determine changes in regional trading 
patterns. This does not augur well for South Asia since relatively little 
trade exists among the countries of the region. One can argue, 
however, that the region’s focus on developed markets resulted from 
political problems that marred relations between India and Pakistan. If 
the recent easing of tensions between the two countries gains 
momentum, some trading patterns may change in favor of 
intraregional trade. The conclusion of free trade arrangements 
between Sri Lanka and India and Sri Lanka and Pakistan might have 
created a sense of dynamism that would move the entire region 
towards an RTA.
When implemented in highly restrictive economic and trading 
environment, RTAs are usually inconsequential. SAPTA did not succeed 
because the South Asian countries had highly protective trade 
regimes. This has changed; external tariffs on trade and other trade-
                                                
156 ibid.
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restricting practices have been reduced considerably in all countries of 
the region157.
Minimize excluded products expand the scope for positive net benefits 
through competition and trade creation. The temptation to use lists of 
sensitive items is not as great when overall tariffs are low. According 
to one review of South Asia’s experience with regional arrangements, 
the 1993 SAPTA “was stillborn, given high levels of protection, a lack 
of meaningful concessions, domestic political problems, hostility 
between India and Pakistan, India’s ban on imports of all consumer 
goods and India’s control over major primary goods”158.
Services bring more benefits to regional economies. India now has a 
highly developed information technology sector that could benefit 
other populous countries, such as Bangladesh and Pakistan, which also 
have a large number of well-educated and well-trained people. At the 
same time, Pakistan has made advances in commercial banking from 
which the regional banking industry could benefit. India, with a much 
larger pool of savings than other countries in the region and with a 
more developed capital market, could help fill the region’s savings and 
investment gap.
                                                
157 World Bank. 2004c. South Asia Free Trade Area: Promise and Pitfalls of Preferential Trade 
Arrangements. Washington D.C.
158 Baysan, T. 2004. South Asia: Lessons and the Way Forward. Mimeo. Washington: World Bank.
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Trade facilitation measures are critical for reducing the cost of trade. 
While the SAFTA declaration incorporates these measures, they have 
to be interpreted much more broadly than seems to be the inclination 
among trade officials working on the modalities of the arrangement.
A SIX-POINT FOR SAFTA:
1. Establish strong political support. It is necessary to establish 
strong political support to ensure the impetus needed to reach the 
goals of the SAFTA agreement. 
2. Establish a regional trade facilitation council. A trade 
facilitation council should be charged with providing an annual report 
to senior political leaders, perhaps at an annual summit, that presents 
the current agenda and describes progress. 
3. Establish national trade facilitation working groups. 
Recognizing that each member country faces different challenges in 
making changes and meeting standards, each country should establish 
standing national working groups for trade facilitation. These working 
groups should also invite substantial participation by the private sector 
and trade experts and have access to the technical assistance 
necessary to assume their responsibilities. 
4. Establish a regional customs committee. A committee 
comprising of the heads of customs agencies in each SAFTA country 
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should be established to work with the trade facilitation council and 
should be represented on the council. 
5. Undertake a regional communications program. A regional 
communications program should be undertaken to improve public 
understanding of the importance of aggressively pursuing measures to 
reduce the costs of trade. Improvements in international rankings, 
such as the GCR, should be publicized.
6. Establish response mechanisms. Public sector mechanisms 
should be put in place to respond rapidly to private sector reports of 
measurable trade transaction costs or delays. Typical bureaucratic 
responses to such shortcomings are not effective. 
Conclusion:
British India was divided on two nation theory159. On the foundation of 
religious conviction India and Pakistan created. Sri Lanka faces civil 
war from the last three decades which is hammered by the cast 
system. Until and unless the people of south Asia heartily believe and 
dream about south Asian union nothing can be achieved. The religious 
partition in 1947 still is a gigantic weapon against any sort of union. It 
                                                
159 The Two-Nation Theory was the basis for the Partition of India in 1947. It stated that Muslims and 
Hindus were two separate nations by every definition, and therefore Muslims should have an autonomous 
homeland in the Muslim majority areas of British India for the safeguard of their political, cultural and 
social rights, within or without a United India. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Two-Nation_Theory.
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is we the people of South Asia who need to change our outlook about 
economic enrichment rather than religious fantasy and drive our 
national leader for greater unification. World Bank (WB) country 
director Xian Zhu argues that although some of the same phenomena 
are present to some degree in South Asia, there has nevertheless been 
a turn for the better in the region due to a number of exceptional 
factors.160
                                                
160 http://thedailystar.net/2007/05/16/d70516011410.htm
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